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We study the holdup problem in repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer such that 
the seller makes relation-specific investments in each period. We show that where, under spot 
transaction, formal contracts have no value because of the cooperative nature of investment, 
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range of parameter values in which a higher investment can be implemented only if a formal 
price contract is written and combined with a relational contract. We also show that there are 
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Relation-speciﬁc investments often cause holdup problems when contracting is in-
complete. Suppose, as an example, that a seller has an opportunity to make an in-
vestment which creates more value inside its relationship to a particular buyer than
outside. The relation-speciﬁc nature of the investment may result in the buyer’s
opportunistic behavior. Contracts contingent upon investment-related information
could protect the seller, but this is often diﬃcult in reality. So, without adequate
contractual protection, the seller’s anticipation of the buyer’s opportunistic behavior
results in a less than socially optimal level of investment. The holdup problem has
played a central role in the economic analysis of organizations and institutions, and
many authors have proposed various organizational interventions, such as vertical
integration (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1985), as remedies to the problem.
In the holdup literature, a fundamental driving force of the ineﬃciency has been
the assumption that contracts contingent upon the nature of relation-speciﬁc invest-
ments are infeasible, which is a realistic assumption in a wide variety of real-world
bilateral trade. On the other hand, the courts can often verify delivery of the goods
by the seller, and hence simple non-contingent contracts based on product deliv-
ery are often feasible. Several articles have recently studied the roles that formal
non-contingent price contracts can play in resolving the holdup problem under spot
transaction (see Section 2 for details).
The present paper oﬀers new perspectives on the roles that such simple non-
contingent contracts can play in resolving the holdup problem. In particular, we
study repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer, and demonstrate that a
formal non-contingent price contract can help resolve the holdup problem by mit-
igating the buyer’s temptation to renege on his/her informal agreement with the
seller.
In reality, relation-speciﬁc investments are often made under long-term and re-
1peated interaction between parties. Coase (1988) pointed out that A.O. Smith, a
large independent manufacturer of automobile frames, had invested in expensive
equipment that was highly speciﬁc to its main customer, such as General Motors,
for more than ﬁfty years. Also, Coase (2000) found that prior to the acquisition of
Fisher Body by General Motors in 1926, Fisher Body had repeatedly made location-
speciﬁc investments for General Motors. Regarding Japanese manufacturer-supplier
relationships, Asanuma (1989) studied the Japanese automobile and the electric ma-
chinery industries and discovered that long-term relationships were more likely to
be found in the transaction of intermediate products that require a high degree of
relation-speciﬁc investments. According to Holmstr¨ om and Roberts (1998, p.83),
“Nucor [the most successful steel maker in the United States over the past 20 years]
decided to make a single ﬁrm, the David J. Joseph Company (DJJ), its sole supplier
of scrap. Total dependence on a single supplier would seem to carry signiﬁcant hold-
up risks, but for more than a decade, this relationship has been working smoothly
and successfully.”
Despite the important connection between relation-speciﬁc investments and long-
term relationships, there have been very few theoretical analyses, to the best of
our knowledge, that have addressed the holdup problem under inﬁnitely repeated
interactions.1 This might be because, due to a reasoning based on the Folk Theorem,
the holdup problem can obviously be resolved under inﬁnitely repeated interactions
if the discount factor is high enough. We show, however, that when the discount
factor is not high enough, formal ﬁxed-price contracts can play a crucial role in
determining the range of the discount factor within which the holdup problem is
resolved.
Along with the repeated interaction, another key element of our analysis con-
1Note that while several recent papers introduce dynamic structures into the analysis of the
holdup problem (Che and S´ akovics, 2004; Gul, 2001; Pitchford and Snyder, 2004), they study re-
peated oﬀers rather than repeated transactions.
2cerns the eﬀect of relation-speciﬁc investment on the alternative-use value. Most
previous theoretical models in the holdup literature assume, implicitly or explicitly,
that relation-speciﬁc investment increases the value of the asset not only within the
relationship but also in alternative uses. However, an equally plausible assumption is
that the investment reduces the value of the asset in alternative uses. For example, if
a seller locates its plant adjacent to a buyer, the seller ends up increasing the distance
of the plant to alternative buyers. That is, a location-speciﬁc investment decreases
the value of the asset in alternative uses. Rajan and Zingales (1998), an impor-
tant exception in the existing literature, argue that relation-speciﬁc investments in
a physical asset imply, almost by deﬁnition, a reduction in the outside value of the
asset. We ﬁnd that this distinction is important when we investigate the value of
formal contracting.2
In our analysis of the repeated interactions between a seller and a buyer, formal
contracting can reduce the buyer’s temptation to renege on his/her informal agree-
ments with the seller when the relation-speciﬁc investment reduces the renegotiation
price. And a necessary condition for the relation-speciﬁc investment to reduce the
renegotiation price is that the investment reduces the alternative-use value, which is
a plausible case as we discussed above. The result is that a formal ﬁxed-price con-
tract, combined with informal agreements sustained by the value of future relation-
ships, can help resolve the holdup problem: A higher investment can be implemented
within a wider range of parameter values (e.g., discount factor) with a combination
of a formal contract and informal agreements rather than with informal agreements
only. In other words, formal contracting can play a complementary role of relaxing
the self-enforceability condition for informal agreements. At the same time, however,
we also ﬁnd that there is a certain alternative range of parameterizations in which
2Segal and Whinston (2000) ﬁnd that the value of exclusive contracts depends on whether the
outside value of the asset is increasing or decreasing in investment. We assume that exclusive
contracts are not feasible because whether or not each party transacts with an alternative outside
party is not veriﬁable.
3formal contracting has either no value, or even negative value (in the sense that a
higher investment can be implemented only if no formal price contract is written).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 relates the present paper
to the existing literature. Section 3 analyzes a simple example in which there are
two levels of investment to illustrate our main result and the intuition behind it.
Section 4 presents our general model of repeated transactions between a seller and a
buyer, in which there are n + 1 possible levels of investment. Section 5 analyzes the
model and ﬁnds, among other things, that although investment is purely cooperative,
there is a range of parameter values under which the buyer is strictly better oﬀ by
oﬀering a formal contract. Section 6 ﬁrst discusses the robustness of our result
when uncertainty is introduced, and then considers an extension of our model that
incorporates the possibility of vertical integration between the seller and the buyer
to demonstrate that writing a formal price contract without integration can still be
valuable. Section 7 concludes.
2 Relationship to the Literature
In this section we discuss our contributions to the existing theoretical literature
on holdup problems, and to the empirical literature on the relationship between
relational governance and formal contracts.
Recently several articles have studied the roles that formal non-contingent price
contracts can play in the resolution of the holdup problem under spot transaction.
Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) considered a bilateral trade relationship in which the
seller and the buyer can write a simple contract specifying a ﬁxed trade price and
quantity at a future date. The seller then decides how much to invest in a relation-
speciﬁc asset that lowers the subsequent cost of producing the good. After the
investment is made, some state uncertainty, which aﬀects the seller’s cost as well as
the buyer’s valuation, is resolved and observed. The buyer and seller are then free to
4renegotiate on the contract with exogenously speciﬁed bargaining strengths. Edlin
and Reichelstein found that a well-designed ﬁxed-price contract can give the seller
eﬃcient investment incentives.
Che and Hausch (1999) pointed out that these previous studies were limited
by their restriction on the nature of the relation-speciﬁc investments; that is, these
studies focused on “selﬁsh” investments that beneﬁted the investor (e.g., the seller’s
investment reduces his production costs). Che and Hausch convincingly argued
through a number of examples that “cooperative” investments (e.g., the seller’s in-
vestment improves the buyer’s value of the good) were equally important, although
cooperative investments had received little attention in the literature. For instance,
the famous General Motors-Fisher Body example deals with Fisher Body’s decision
of building a plant adjacent to General Motors. Such an arrangement involves a
“selﬁsh” as well as a “cooperative” aspect because it not only lowers the seller’s
shipping costs but also improves its supply reliability.
Che and Hausch’s results for cooperative investments are very diﬀerent from
those of Edlin and Reichelstein for selﬁsh investments. They considered a bilateral
trade relationship similar to the one analyzed by Edlin and Reichelstein. The most
important result of Che and Hausch concerns the case in which the parties cannot
credibly commit not to renegotiate the contract. They showed that if investments
are suﬃciently cooperative, there exists an intermediate range of bargaining shares
for which contracting has no value, i.e., contracting oﬀers the parties no advantages
over ex post negotiation. In particular, contracting has no value for any parameter
range if both investments are purely cooperative (that is, the seller’s investment
beneﬁts the buyer only, and the buyer’s investment beneﬁts the seller only).
We contribute to the existing theoretical literature by demonstrating that formal
non-contingent price contracts can be valuable even if the relation-speciﬁc investment
is purely cooperative. In particular, we show that under repeated interaction between
5parties, a formal price contract can help resolve the holdup problem by mitigating
the buyer’s temptation to renege on his/her informal agreement with the seller. A
necessary condition for this result is that the investment reduces the alternative-
use value, which is a plausible case as discussed in the Introduction. In our base
model which contains no uncertainty, formal price contracts can be valuable under
repeated transactions but are not valuable under spot transaction. In Subsection 6.1
we analyze an extension which contains uncertainty, and ﬁnd the following results:
(i) non-contingent formal contracts can be valuable even under spot transaction;3
and (ii) if the transaction is repeated inﬁnitely, non-contingent formal contracts are
valuable within a broader range of parameter values because of the role that formal
contracts can play under repeated transactions in mitigating the buyer’s reneging
temptation.
Our analysis of informal agreements builds on a general analysis of “relational
contracts” by Levin (2003). Baker et al. (1994) and Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995)
study how formal contracting aﬀects the self-enforceability of informal agreements.
These three papers do not, however, analyze the holdup problem, and hence in their
models there is no renegotiation within each period. In our model on the other
hand, intra-period renegotiation and the resulting reneging temptation associated
with relation-speciﬁc investments are crucial features. Baker et al. (2001, 2002),
Halonen (2002), and Morita (2001) analyze the holdup problem in inﬁnitely repeated
transactions, but their focus is quite diﬀerent from ours. Baker et al. (2001, 2002) and
Halonen (2002) study how asset ownership aﬀects the self-enforceability of relational
contracts, and Morita (2001) focuses on the role of partial ownership in resolving the
holdup problem under repeated interaction. None of the studies captures the idea
that formal contracts can play an important role in reducing reneging temptations
under repeated transactions, nor do they identify whether the alternative-use value
3A necessary condition for this result, again, is that the relation-speciﬁc investment reduces the
alternative-use value. This possibility was not considered by Che and Hausch (1999).
6is increasing or decreasing in investment as an important factor in determining the
value of formal contracting.4
The present paper also sheds a new light on recent empirical investigations on the
relationship between relational governance and formal contracts. In the empirical
literature of transaction cost economics, the majority of previous researchers have
studied how several transactional properties (representing asset speciﬁcity, uncer-
tainty and transactional frequency) aﬀect an organizational mode, conceptualized
by market, hierarchy, or various hybrid and intermediate modes (see e.g. Shelanski
and Klein (1995) and Boerner and Macher (2002) for surveys).
Several researchers have recently made an important contribution to this lit-
erature by investigating the relationship between relational governance and formal
contracts (see e.g. Banerjee and Duﬂo (2000); Poppo and Zenger (2002); Kalnins
and Mayer (2004)). It has often been argued that relational governance and formal
contracts are substitutes rather than complements (see Dyer and Singh (1998) and
Adler (2001), among others), and that the use of formal contracts may even have
undesirable consequences under relational governance (see Macaulay (1963) for an
empirical investigation and Bernheim and Whinston (1998) for a theoretical analy-
sis). In contrast, Poppo and Zenger (2002) have recently presented evidence which
suggests that relational governance and formal contracts can be complements. In
their investigation of informational service outsourcing they found that, controlling
for several transactional properties such as asset speciﬁcity, increases in the level
of relational governance were associated with greater levels of complexity in formal
contracts (see Ryall and Sampson (2006) for a related ﬁnding).
We contribute to this line of investigation by exploring the relationship between
relational governance and formal contracts in the presence of the holdup problem.
4Although Baker et al. (2001, 2002) employ a holdup model diﬀerent from ours, integration in
their model and formal contracting in our model play a similar role of eliminating ex post rene-
gotiation opportunities. We will further elaborate the diﬀerence between their papers and ours in
Subsection 6.2 by introducing asset ownership into our model.
7Our analysis identiﬁes whether the alternative-use value is increasing or decreasing in
investment as an important factor in determining the value of formal contracts. We
ﬁnd that relational governance and formal contracts can be complements or substi-
tutes, and that the use of formal contacts may even have undesirable consequences.
Our analysis indicates that they are complements when the relation-speciﬁc invest-
ment reduces the renegotiation price, and a necessary condition for this is that the
investment reduces the alternative-use value.
3E x a m p l e
Setting We can illustrate our main result and the intuition behind it by a simple
example. There is a seller and a buyer. In each period, the seller can produce at most
one unit of a product, and the buyer purchases at most one unit of the product. In
each period the seller has an opportunity to make an investment. The seller chooses
either not to invest (0) or to invest (1). The cost for the investment is a>0.
The investment does not aﬀect the seller’s production cost, which is normal-
ized to zero, but inﬂuences the value of the product for the buyer as well as its
alternative-use value. That is, the investment is purely cooperative. Let vi be the
value for the buyer and mi the alternative-use value if investment is i =0 ,1. We
assume Δv ≡ v1 − v0 > 0. Most previous theoretical models in the holdup liter-
ature assume, implicitly or explicitly, that Δm ≡ m1 − m0 ≥ 0: Relation-speciﬁc
investments increase alternative-use values (at least weakly) as well. However, we
believe that m1 <m 0 is equally plausible as discussed in the Introduction. For
example, suppose that investment 0 represents a general-purpose investment, while
1 represents a relation-speciﬁc investment. If the seller makes the general-purpose
investment, he can produce the general product that has value m0 for alternative
users. If the seller makes the speciﬁc investment, he can produce the product that is
customized to the buyer. And if an alternative user purchases the speciﬁc product,
8the user must incur an adjustment cost c>0 in order to convert it to the general
product, and hence the eﬀective value of the speciﬁc product for the alternative user
is m0 − c, which is smaller than m0.5 Alternatively, suppose that the seller chooses
two kinds of investments, a relation-speciﬁc investment (zero or one unit) that only
increases the value for the buyer, and a general-purpose investment (zero or one unit)
that only increases the alternative-use value. And suppose further that because of
various resource constraints, the seller can invest at most one unit of investment.
This interpretation of the model corresponds to the case m1 <m 0.6
We thus do not assume Δm ≥ 0 in our analysis but distinguish between Δm ≥ 0
case and Δm < 0 case. We assume (i) Δv >a>Δm; and (ii) v0 ≥ max{m1,m 0}.
These two assumptions imply that it is eﬃcient for the seller to invest and trade
with the buyer, but the investment cannot be realized under spot transaction.
Each period starts with the buyer’s decision to oﬀer a price contract. We make
a standard assumption that all the relevant variables are observable but unveriﬁable
to both the seller and the buyer, while delivery and transfer are veriﬁable, and hence
a simple price contract can be written and enforced. The buyer’s oﬀer is a take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀer, and the price contract can be a formal contract, an informal agreement,
or a combination of these two. Then, if the price contract contains a formal contract,
the seller decides whether or not to sign it. Second, the seller chooses whether or not
to invest. Third, the buyer and the seller engage in renegotiation, in which the buyer
makes a take-it-or-leave-it price oﬀer to purchase a product from the seller. Finally,
the seller produces a product and sells it to the buyer or in the outside market.
Spot transaction We ﬁrst analyze the benchmark case of spot transaction where
the seller and the buyer meet only once, or do not use history-dependent strategies.
We solve for subgame perfect equilibria of the stage game. The buyer’s renegotiation
5See also Rajan and Zingales (1998).
6See Cai (2003) who studies such a multi-dimensional investment model in which increasing
relation-speciﬁc investment reduces general-purpose investment and hence reduces the outside value.
9price oﬀer is pi = mi if investment is i =0 ,1. Since m0 − (m1 − a)=−Δm + a>0,
the seller chooses not to invest (underinvestment) and hence the holdup problem
arises.
Formal contracts do not help under spot transaction. Consider a simple ﬁxed-
price contract such as “pay price p for the delivery of the product.” It is enforced
with a speciﬁc performance damage clause, which is a standard legal breach remedy
often applied in practice: when one party sues for speciﬁc performance, the court
orders the second party to perform exactly what the contract speciﬁes. Such a
contract can resolve the holdup problem if the investment is purely “selﬁsh” as in
Edlin and Reichelstein (1996). However, when investment is purely “cooperative”
as in our model, the seller chooses not to invest in order to save the investment cost
a, and hence underinvestment persists.7 In fact Che and Hausch (1999) showed, in
a general setup, that if the parties cannot commit themselves not to renegotiate,
they cannot do better by writing a formal contract, along with any communication
mechanism, than having no contract.
Repeated transactions without a formal contract We now show that this
result for spot transaction changes dramatically under repeated transactions. We
consider inﬁnitely repeated interaction with perfect monitoring between the seller
and the buyer with the common discount factor δ ∈ (0,1), and solve for subgame
perfect equilibria of the inﬁnitely repeated game that can implement the eﬃcient
outcome (investment by the seller). We focus on trigger-strategy equilibria, in which
after either party reneges, both the seller and the buyer follow the static equilib-
rium strategies under spot transaction forever from the next period on. We assume
without loss of generality that they do not write a formal contract under the static
equilibrium.
Consider the following strategies under which the buyer does not oﬀer a formal
7Note that the price contract cannot be contingent on investment that is unveriﬁable.
10contract. At the beginning of each period, the buyer promises to pay b = m0 + a
conditional on the seller’s investment. And the buyer actually pays b if the seller
invests. If the seller chooses no investment, the buyer oﬀers p0 = m0 at the renego-
tiation stage in the same period, and then reverts to the static equilibrium strategy
from the next period on. The seller chooses to invest if the buyer actually paid b in
the previous periods. Otherwise, he continues to choose not to invest forever.
If the seller believes that the buyer follows the strategy given above, then in-
vestment results in payoﬀ b − a = m0 in each period, while no investment yields
payoﬀ p0 = m0. The seller thus has no incentive to deviate, and chooses to invest.
However, the buyer may have an incentive to cheat. Suppose the seller invests in a
given period. The buyer will be better oﬀ in that period by deviating from paying
b and instead oﬀering p1 = m1, which the seller will accept. The buyer’s reneging











The buyer honors the promise if and only if
a − Δm ≤
δ
1 − δ
(Δv − a), (1)
that is, if the reneging temptation does not exceed the future loss.
Repeated transactions with a formal contract Next, suppose that in each
period the buyer oﬀers a formal ﬁxed-price contract. And we allow the buyer to
combine the formal contract with an informal promise. We thus consider the fol-
lowing strategies. At the beginning of each period, the buyer writes a formal price
contract p to be paid for delivery of the product, and in addition, promises to pay a
bonus b if the seller invests. If the seller does not invest, the buyer will revert to the
11static equilibrium strategy from the next period on. The seller chooses to invest if
the buyer actually oﬀers contract p and pays b in the previous periods. Otherwise,
he/she continues to choose no investment forever.
The important diﬀerence from the no-formal-contract scenario concerns what
happens when the buyer reneges on the promised bonus b after the investment is
made by the seller, and what happens when the seller does not invest. In both
cases, although the buyer does not pay the bonus b, he/she is forced to pay p by
the speciﬁc performance damage clause, and the buyer and the seller cannot agree
on a renegotiation price because at least one party must prefer the formal price p.
Keeping this diﬀerence in mind, we derive the conditions for the eﬃcient outcome
to be implemented.
If the seller believes that the buyer follows the strategy given above, then invest-
ment results in payoﬀ p + b − a in each period, while no investment yields payoﬀ p
in the current period, and m0 from the next period on. The seller thus chooses to
invest if his/her reneging temptation p−(p+b−a)=a−b is at most as high as the
future loss:
a − b ≤
δ
1 − δ
(p + b − a − m0)( 2 )
Suppose next that the seller invests in a given period. The buyer’s reneging
temptation is p + b − p = b. His/her future loss from cheating is given by
δ
1 − δ
[(v1 − p − b) − (v0 − m0)] =
δ
1 − δ
(Δv − p − b + m0).




(Δv − p − b + m0). (3)
Summing inequalities (2) and (3) yields a necessary condition for the eﬃcient out-





(Δv − a). (4)
Conversely, if (4) holds, the buyer can ﬁnd a self-enforcing contract (p,b)t h a t
implements the eﬃcient outcome. The best combination for the buyer is to leave
no rent to the seller, (p,b) satisfying p + b = m0 + a. Substituting this into (2)
yields b ≥ a, and hence (p,b)=( m0,a) is one best combination for the buyer: the
seller chooses to invest without any rent because the informal bonus contingent upon
investment just covers the investment cost a.
Comparison We now compare the result under no formal contract with that under
a ﬁxed-price contract. Since the buyer can extract all the surplus if an eﬃcient
equilibrium exists, the comparison is in terms of the condition for its existence,
that is, between (1) and (4). First suppose Δm < 0. Then (1) implies (4) but
the reverse is not true. This implies that the buyer is never worse oﬀ by writing
an appropriate formal contract, and that, although investment is purely cooperative
and hence writing a formal contract does not help at all under spot transaction, there
is a range of parameter values under which the buyer is strictly better oﬀ by oﬀering
a formal contract. That is, under a certain range of parameter values, the buyer
cannot induce the seller to invest without a well-designed formal price contract.
The intuition here goes as follows. In order to induce the seller to invest, the buyer
oﬀers an informal but self-enforcing pay contingent on the seller’s investment. This
role is played by b in either case. The diﬀerence is in the reneging temptation. Since
all the surplus goes to the buyer, we can restrict our attention to the buyer’s reneging
temptation. When no formal contract is written, the buyer can hold the seller up by
not paying b = m0+a and instead oﬀering a renegotiation price m1 = m0+Δm.T h e
buyer’s reneging temptation here is b − m1 = a − Δm. On the other hand, when a
13formal price contract p = m0 is written, the buyer cannot renegotiate the price down
from m0 to m1 = m0 +Δ m (recall that we consider Δm < 0 case here). This means
that the buyer can eﬀectively reduce his/her reneging temptation from a−Δm to a
by writing the formal ﬁxed-price contract.
Can the self-enforceability of the contract (p,b) be enhanced by further reducing
the buyer’s reneging temptation from a? The answer is no, and the logic is as
follows. Suppose that the buyer reduces b from a to a −  , which decreases his/her
own reneging temptation by  . However, this reduction of the bonus increases the
seller’s reneging temptation. That is, the left-hand side of (2) is now positive  ,a n d
hence the buyer must give per period rent  (1 − δ)/δ to the seller to prevent the
seller’s temptation of no investment. This in turn means that the present discounted
value of the buyer’s future loss from reneging (the right-hand side of (3)) must also
be reduced by  . The result is that the self-enforceability of the contract cannot be
enhanced by reducing the buyer’s reneging temptation from a.
Next suppose Δm ≥ 0. In this case we ﬁnd that the buyer is never better oﬀ
by writing a formal contract, and if Δm > 0, there is a range of parameter values
under which the buyer is strictly worse oﬀ by oﬀering a formal price contract. To see
why, suppose that the buyer oﬀers a formal ﬁxed-price contract. As shown above,
the best combination for the buyer is (p,b) satisfying p + b = m0 + a and b ≥ a,
and hence the buyer’s reneging temptation is at least a. On the other hand, when
no formal contract is written, as shown above, the buyer’s reneging temptation is
a − Δm, which is less than a given Δm > 0.
In the subsequent sections, we show the optimality of writing a formal contract
in repeated transactions more generally. We show when it helps to combine a formal
contract with an informal agreement, and when an informal promise is suﬃcient.
144M o d e l
We consider repeated transactions between an upstream party (seller) and a down-
stream party (buyer). In each period, the seller chooses an investment level a ∈ A
by incurring private cost d(a). We assume that there are n + 1 possible investment
levels a0,a 1,...,a n that are measured in terms of the investment costs, and hence
d(ai)=ai, and we assume 0 ≤ a0 <a 1 < ···<a n.
The seller’s investment aﬀects (i) the value of the seller’s product for the buyer
and (ii) the alternative-use value of the product. When the seller’s investment is
ai,l e tvi be the value for the buyer and mi be the alternative-use value, which we
assume for simplicity to be equal to the price the seller can sell to an alternative
user.8 The buyer’s payoﬀ is zero when the seller does not sell the product to him/her.
For simplicity, we assume that at most one unit of the product is traded, and the
production cost is normalized to zero. We assume vi is strictly increasing in i,
v0 ≥ maxi mi,a n dvi >a i for all i, so that it is always eﬃcient for the seller
and the buyer to trade. Denote the eﬃcient investment by a∗: a∗ = aj where
j =a r gm a x i(vi − ai). We assume a∗ is unique and a∗ >a 0.
The alternative-use value mi may be increasing or decreasing (it can be non-
monotonic as well). We however follow the holdup literature by assuming that
investment aﬀects vi at least as much as mi at margins:
vi − vi−1 ≥ mi − mi−1 for i =1 ,...,n.( 5 )
We assume that ai, vi,a n dmi are observable to both parties but unveriﬁable,
while delivery of the product and transfer payments are veriﬁable, and hence a ﬁxed-
price contract is feasible and enforced with a speciﬁc performance damage clause.
In each period, the timing is as follows. First, the seller and the buyer may sign
8The eﬀects of introducing uncertainty will be discussed in Subsection 6.1.
15a contract. Second, the seller chooses investment. Third, the seller and the buyer
(re)negotiate a price. We assume that the parties cannot commit themselves not
to renegotiate, and the renegotiation price is determined by the generalized Nash
bargaining solution. Let α ∈ [0,1) be the seller’s share of the gain from trade, and
hence the buyer’s share is 1 − α. Fourth, the seller produces and sells the product
to the buyer at the agreed price or in the outside market.
5A n a l y s i s
5.1 Spot Transaction
When the seller and the buyer meet only once, or they do not use history depen-
dent strategies, a standard holdup problem can arise. Suppose that no formal price
contract is written at the beginning. Since trade is always eﬃcient, the seller and
the buyer decide to trade and negotiate the price after the seller makes an invest-
ment. When the seller chooses ai, the gain from trade is vi − mi, and hence the
renegotiation price pi satisﬁes
pi = mi + α(vi − mi)=αvi +( 1− α)mi.
The seller’s payoﬀ is thus
pi − ai = αvi +( 1− α)mi − ai.
The seller chooses the investment that maximizes pi − ai.L e t ao be the optimal
investment under spot transaction: ao = aj where j =a r gm a x i(pi − ai).
In this setup it is easy to show that the seller does not overinvest.
Proposition 1 If no formal price contract is written at the beginning, the seller
does not overinvest under spot transaction: a∗ ≥ ao.
16Proof Let a∗ = aj and ao = ai, and suppose instead aj <a i.S i n c eaj is uniquely
eﬃcient, vj − aj >v i − ai,o r
ai − aj >v i − vj
holds. On the other hand, since ai is optimal under spot transaction, pi−ai ≥ pj−aj
holds. Then, by α<1, ai >a j, and (5),
ai − aj ≤ α(vi − vj)+( 1− α)(mi − mj) ≤ vi − vj
must hold, which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Since the seller cannot reap all the returns from the investment, his/her optimal
investment choice is at most a∗. To make the analysis interesting, we hereafter
assume a∗ >a o:I fa∗ = aj,t h e r ee x i s t si<jsuch that
aj − ai >α (vj − vi)+( 1− α)(mj − mi). (6)
When ao = ai, deﬁne the seller’s payoﬀ, the buyer’s payoﬀ, and the joint surplus,
respectively, as follows:
πo
S = w + pi − ai,π o
B = vi − w − pi,π o = πo
S + πo
B = vi − ai
where w is a ﬁxed transfer paid from the buyer to the seller at the beginning of the
period (negative w implies payment from the seller to the buyer) that serves the
distribution purpose only.
175.2 Relational Contract
We now consider the case in which the seller and the buyer engage in inﬁnitely
repeated transactions, with the common discount factor δ. Suppose that at the
beginning of each period the seller and the buyer agree on an informal compensa-
tion plan, with the seller’s promising investment aj. In this subsection, we assume
no formal price contract is written. The eﬀects of writing a formal price contract
are analyzed in the next subsection. The informal compensation plan consists of
(w,b0,...,b n), where w is paid from the buyer to the seller at the beginning of each
period, and bi is a price paid by the buyer when the seller’s investment is ai (bi may
be negative, in which case it is a penalty paid by the seller). A relational contract
is a complete plan for the relationship, describing the compensation plan and the
seller’s investment for every period and history. We study trigger-strategy equilibria
in which if either party reneges on the payment or investment, they renegotiate to
determine the price, and, from the next period on, they revert to spot transaction.
The optimal contract is the one that maximizes the joint surplus.
We focus on stationary contracts under which in every period the parties agree on
the same compensation plan and the seller chooses the same investment on the equi-
librium path. Our focus on stationary contracts is without loss of generality, due to
Levin (2003): if an optimal contract exists, there are optimal stationary contracts.9
And a similar logic can be applied to show that we can further restrict our atten-
tion to contracts that provide the seller’s investment incentives with discretionary
payments alone.
Since a relational contract is in general contingent on the seller’s investment
which is observable but unveriﬁable, it must satisfy conditions under which it is
neither party’s interest to renege on the contract: it must be self-enforcing, i.e.,
9Although Levin (2003) does not analyze a case where the parties engage in renegotiation in each
period, it is straightforward to generalize his results to such a situation.
18a subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game. We obtain conditions under
which there exists a self-enforcing (stationary) relational contract that implements
a given investment aj attaining a higher total surplus than ao.
First, the seller’s incentive compatibility constraints are given as follows.
bj − bi ≥ aj − ai for all i  = j (IC)
Note that future payoﬀs do not appear in the constraints.
Second, if the seller chooses ai and the buyer does not pay the discretionary price
bi, then there is renegotiation and the price to be paid is pi = αvi +(1− α)mi.T h e
reneging temptation of the buyer is thus bi−pi. He/she will then lose his/her future
per period gain vj − w − bj − πo
B. The buyer therefore honors the agreement if and
only if
bi − pi ≤
δ
1 − δ
(vj − w − bj − πo
B)
holds for all i. The equivalent condition is given as follows.
max
i
(bi − pi) ≤
δ
1 − δ
(vj − w − bj − πo
B). (7)
Third, if the seller chooses ai and does not pay the penalty −bi,h e / s h ei si n s t e a d
paid the renegotiation price pi. The seller’s reneging temptation is hence −(bi −pi).
His/her future per period loss is w + bj − aj − πo
S. The seller therefore honors the
agreement if and only if
−(bi − pi) ≤
δ
1 − δ
(w + bj − aj − πo
S)
holds for all i. This condition is equivalent to
−min
i
(bi − pi) ≤
δ
1 − δ
(w + bj − aj − πo
S). (8)
19Combining (7) and (8) yields a single necessary condition:
max
i
(bi − pi) − min
i
(bi − pi) ≤
δ
1 − δ
(πj − πo)( 9 )
where πj = vj − aj is the total surplus under investment aj. And (IC) and (9) are
also suﬃcient for investment aj to be implemented: one can ﬁnd an appropriate w
such that (7), (8), and the parties’ participation constraints are satisﬁed.
Now suppose ao = ak,a n daj can be implemented. There exists a compensation




(bi − pi) − min
i
(bi − pi) ≥ (bj − pj) − (bk − pk)
holds. Therefore by (IC) and (9), the following condition follows.
(aj − ak) − (pj − pk) ≤
δ
1 − δ
(πj − πo). (DE-NC)
The next proposition shows that condition (DE-NC) is necessary and suﬃcient
for the implementation of aj.
Proposition 2 Suppose no formal price contract is written and ao = ak. Investment
aj satisfying πj >π k can be implemented by a relational contract if and only if (DE-
NC) holds.
Proof We only need to prove the suﬃciency part. Supposing (DE-NC), we con-
struct a compensation plan that satisﬁes (IC) and (9). Let bk be given arbitrarily
20and deﬁne b0,...,b n as follows:10
bj − bk = aj − ak
bi − bk = pi − pk, for all i  = j
(10)
By deﬁnition, (IC) is satisﬁed for i = k.A n df o ri  = k, (IC) holds because
(bj − bi) − (aj − ai)=( bj − bk) − (aj − ak)+( bk − bi) − (ak − ai)
=( bk − bi) − (ak − ai)
=( pk − pi) − (ak − ai) ≥ 0
where the second and the third equalities follow from the deﬁnition of bi and bk,a n d
the inequality holds because ao = ak.
We next show maxi(bi − pi)=bj − pj.F i r s t ,f o ri = k,
(bj − pj) − (bk − pk)=( pk − pj) − (bk − bj)
=( pk − pj) − (ak − aj) ≥ 0
by the deﬁnition of bj and bk,a n dao = ak. Next, by the deﬁnition of bi and bk,f o r
i  = j,k,
(bi − pi) − (bk − pk)=( bi − bk) − (pi − pk) = 0 (11)
and hence (bj − pj) − (bi − pi)=( bj − pj) − (bk − pk) ≥ 0.
Furthermore, (11) yields mini(bi − pi)=bk − pk. We therefore obtain
max
i
(bi − pi) − min
i
(bi − pi)=( bj − pj) − (bk − pk)
=( aj − ak) − (pj − pk)
10The ﬁxed payment w is only used to guarantee that (7), (8), and the participation constraints
are satisﬁed.
21(9) now follows from (DE-NC). Q.E.D.
Condition (DE-NC) is the necessary and suﬃcient condition for aj to be imple-
mented without any formal price contract under repeated transactions. Note that
the condition only depends on the parameters under the investment which is to be
implemented (aj) and the investment which is most preferred by the seller under spot
transaction (ao = ak). Intuitively, the seller’s incentive compatibility constraints are
binding at ai = ak, and the buyer must pay the seller suﬃciently higher (aj − ak)
for investment aj than for ak. However, the higher pay for aj results in reneging
temptations for both parties. The buyer faces the temptation not to pay bonus bj
but to pay the renegotiation price pj. The seller faces the temptation to choose ak,
and not to pay penalty −bk but to receive pk. The total reneging temptation is thus
equal to the left-hand side of (DE-NC), which must be at most as large as the total
future loss.
Note that the right-hand side of (9) or (DE-NC) does not depend on the com-
pensation plan. There is hence no compensation plan that makes the total reneg-
ing temptation given in the left-hand side of (9) smaller than the left-hand side of
(DE-NC). Therefore, the compensation plan that satisﬁes (10) in the proof of the
proposition minimizes the left-hand side of (9), and in this sense, it is an optimal
contract implementing a given investment aj.
5.3 Formal Price Contract
Next, suppose that at the beginning of each period the buyer and the seller sign
a formal ﬁxed-price contract enforced with a speciﬁc performance damage clause.11
Since in our model the investment is purely cooperative, ﬁxed-price contracts perform
11Our focus on ﬁxed-price contracts as a form of formal contracts can be justiﬁed by our objective
to show that even writing a simple ﬁxed-price formal contract can help mitigate the holdup problem
under repeated transactions while it does not under spot transaction (Proposition 4 (a)). See
footnote 14 for a related discussion.
22at most as well as no contract under spot transaction. To see this, note that no
renegotiation occurs since trade is always eﬃcient. And since the seller is sure to
receive the contractually speciﬁed ﬁxed price, he/she has an incentive to minimize
the investment cost by choosing a0. The seller can in fact save costs since the court
cannot observe this deviation.12 The outcome is worse than the no contract case
where although the seller underinvests, he/she may choose an investment higher
than a0.13
The story is diﬀerent for repeated transactions. We again focus on stationary
contracts that provide the seller’s incentives with payments only. Let p be the
price speciﬁed in the formal ﬁxed-price contract at the beginning of each period. In
addition, the parties can also agree on a compensation plan (w,b0,...,b n). Note
that if either party reneges on payments, no renegotiation arises because price p is
enforced. From the next period on, the parties revert to spot transaction in which
we assume no formal price contract is written since writing a formal contract is
weakly dominated. We derive conditions for the self-enforcing relational contract
implementing a given investment aj to exist.
The seller’s incentive compatibility constraints do not change from those under





(vj − p − w − bj − πo
B)






(vj − p − w − bj − πo
B).
Note that after reneging, the seller and the buyer do not agree to renegotiate the
12See footnote 14 for other forms of formal contracts.
13It is easy to show that the total surplus under a
o = ak is at least as large as that under a0.




(p + w + bj − aj − πo
S)






(p + w + bj − aj − πo
S).








(πj − πo) (12)
By further combining (IC) and (12), we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3 Investment aj satisfying πj >π o can be implemented by a combi-
nation of a formal price contract and a relational contract if and only if the following
condition holds.
aj − a0 ≤
δ
1 − δ
(πj − πo)( D E - F P )
Proof The necessity part follows from maxi bi − mini bi ≥ bj − b0 and (IC) for
i = 0. To prove the suﬃciency part, suppose (DE-FP) holds. And for an arbitrary
b0 deﬁne b1,...,b n by bj − b0 = aj − a0 and bi = b0 for all i>0a n di  = j.S i n c e






bi = bj − b0 = aj − a0.
Q.E.D.
245.4 Comparison
We can analyze the value of writing a formal ﬁxed-price contract in repeated transac-
tions by comparing two conditions, (DE-NC) for the case of no formal price contract,
and (DE-FP) for the case of writing a formal price contract.
The conditions diﬀer only in terms of the reneging temptations given on the
left-hand sides, and the reneging temptations are diﬀerent in two respects. One
diﬀerence is captured by the term −(pj − pk), which appears in (DE-NC) but does
not appear in (DE-FP). The diﬀerence arises because, after reneging, the seller and
the buyer renegotiate the price to trade the product under no formal contract, while
no renegotiation occurs under formal price contract because price p is enforced.
Hence renegotiation aﬀects the reneging temptation only when no formal contract is
written.
The other diﬀerence, captured by the term (aj − ak)i n( D E - N C )a n dt h et e r m
(aj − a0) in (DE-FP), arises because the seller’s optimal investment under spot
transaction may be diﬀerent. It is always a0 under a formal ﬁxed-price contract, while
the optimal investment under no formal contract, ao (≡ ak), may be higher than a0.
Under no formal price contract, the seller may choose an investment higher than
the least costly level because the investment aﬀects the renegotiation price. When
no formal contract is written, there is renegotiation, and the renegotiation price
depends on the seller’s share (α), the value for the buyer (vi), and the alternative-
use value (mi). Since the value for the buyer is increasing in investment, it provides
the seller with an incentive to choose higher investment if the seller’s share is positive.
Furthermore, if the alternative-use value increases with investment, it provides an
additional incentive to increase investment, although the eﬀect is not as large as that
of the value for the buyer because of (5). And even if the alternative-use value is
decreasing, the marginal beneﬁt of investment for the buyer captured by the seller
may be so large that the seller is induced to choose ao >a 0.
25The following comparative result is now immediate.
Proposition 4 Suppose ao = ak and consider the implementation of aj satisfying
πj >π o.
(a) Suppose (ak − a0)+( pj − pk) < 0h o l d s . I faj can be implemented under
repeated transactions without any formal contract, the same investment can
be implemented under repeated transactions with an appropriate formal ﬁxed-
price contract. And there is a range of parameter values in which aj can be
implemented only if a formal price contract is written.
(b) Suppose (ak−a0)+(pj−pk) > 0h o l d s .I faj can be implemented under repeated
transactions with a formal ﬁxed-price contract, the same investment can be
implemented under repeated transactions without any formal price contract.
And there is a range of parameter values in which aj can be implemented only
if no formal price contract is written.
Proposition 4 (a) shows that in contrast to a well-known result in the case of
spot transaction that “formal contracting has no value,” a simple ﬁxed-price contract,
combined with an informal compensation plan, can help mitigate the holdup problem
under repeated transactions. Condition (ak −a0)+(pj −pk) < 0 reﬂects two sources
of diﬀerences in the reneging temptation explained above. To better understand the
condition, we ﬁrst suppose ao = ak = a0: under spot transaction, the seller faces no
incentive to invest higher than the least costly investment. This holds if
α(vi − v0)+( 1− α)(mi − m0) <a i − a0, for all i>0. (13)
Then the condition (ak −a0)+(pj −pk) < 0i se q u i v a l e n tt opj <p 0. By eliminating
the eﬀect of the renegotiation price on the reneging temptation, a well-designed
formal price contract reduces the reneging temptation from (aj − a0) − (pj − p0)t o
26aj − a0. Therefore, there is a range of parameter values in which (DE-FP) holds
while (DE-NC) does not.
Since the renegotiation price is determined by the generalized Nash bargaining
solution, pj−p0 = α(vj−v0)+(1−α)(mj−m0). A necessary condition for pj−p0 < 0
is thus mj <m 0: the alternative-use value must be lower under the higher investment
aj than under a0. We have already argued in the previous sections that this is
plausible under some settings. Under repeated transactions, this marginal change
of the alternative-use value brings a new negative eﬀect of raising the total reneging
temptation under no formal contract. The ﬁxed-price contract can eliminate this
negative “market incentive” and hence can be valuable.
On the other hand, Proposition 4 (b) shows that if the marginal eﬀect of in-
vestment on the alternative-use value is positive, the ﬁxed-price contract has no
value even under repeated interactions.14 Furthermore, eliminating such a positive
“market incentive” by writing a ﬁxed-price contract may reduce the total surplus
14To explore the robustness of our results, we considered two other well-studied forms of formal
contracts. First, consider a formal contract that speciﬁes an option for the buyer to purchase the
product at a prespeciﬁed price p. It is well known that under spot transaction, such an option
contract resolves the holdup problem if the parties could commit not to renegotiate. In our model
with a
∗ = aj and a
o = ak, setting price p
∗ = vj does the job. To see this, ﬁrst note that observing
investment ai, the buyer exercises the option and obtains payoﬀ vi − p
∗ if ai ≥ aj, and rejects the
product (payoﬀ zero) if ai <a j. Expecting this response, the seller prefers to choose aj and obtain
payoﬀ p
∗−aj than to choose ai <a j with payoﬀ mi−ai. However, since they cannot commit not to
renegotiate, the buyer does not exercise the option and instead settles with the renegotiation price
pi if p
∗ >p i. The seller therefore chooses ai that maximizes min(p
∗,p i)−ai, which cannot attain a
total surplus higher than vk − ak. Although it is true that repeated interaction enables the parties
to commit themselves not to renegotiate, the reneging temptation must be low enough to make
such a commitment credible. And since reneging leads to renegotiation, the necessary and suﬃcient
condition for aj to be implemented turns out to be the same as (DE-NC), the condition under no
formal contract. Formal option contracts are hence of no value even under repeated transactions.
As another well-studied contract, consider the following contract (p
1,p
0), where p
1 is the price
the buyer has to pay if he/she agrees to buy the product, while p
0 is the price that he/she pays if
he/she decides not to buy it (a liquidated damage measure). Again, this contract can resolve the
holdup problem if no renegotiation is allowed. Since this contract is essentially equivalent to the
option contract with p
1 − p
0 being the option price, it is susceptible to renegotiation under spot
transaction, and it has no value under repeated transactions.
In summary, we have found that these more complicated (but common) forms of formal contracts
have no value even under repeated transactions. Note that this ﬁnding does not aﬀect the value of
Proposition 4 (a), because the point here is that even writing a simple ﬁxed-price formal contract
can help mitigate the holdup problem under repeated transactions, but it does not under spot
transaction.
27under repeated transactions. Note that the result follows even though the marginal
beneﬁt on the alternative-use value is not large enough to increase the seller’s invest-
ment from the least costly level under a spot transaction. The formal price contract
has a negative value because of the increasing reneging temptation under repeated
transactions.15
The two-investment example in Section 3 corresponds to α = 0 (the buyer’s
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer), and hence the sign of Δm = m1 − m0 is the same as that
of p1 − p0: whether or not the alternative-use value is increasing or decreasing fully
determines the value of writing a formal contract. In more general settings analyzed
here, not only the marginal eﬀect of investment on the alternative-use value but also
the marginal eﬀect on the value for the buyer matters.
We have so far developed intuition under assumption (13) so that ao = a0,i n
order to clarify how crucial is the marginal eﬀect of investment on the renegotiation
price, and in particular the alternative-use value, for the value of writing a formal
price contract. Now consider a more general case of ao = ak ≥ a0. Suppose the
investment incentive through renegotiation is so strong that the seller is induced to
choose an investment higher than the least costly level even under spot transaction
(ak >a 0). This advantage of not writing a formal price contract under spot trans-
action plays an additional beneﬁcial role of reducing the reneging temptation under
repeated transactions, because the incentive necessary to induce the seller to choose
aj decreases from aj−a0 to aj−ak. The condition for writing a formal price contract
to be valuable is now (ak −a0)+(pj −pk) < 0: the value of writing a formal contract
thus may not be positive even if the renegotiation price is decreasing (pj <p k).
15This result has a ﬂavor of an endogenous incomplete contract. Bernheim and Whinston (1998)
show that parties may optimally leave some veriﬁable aspects of performance unspeciﬁed (“strategic
ambiguity”) in order to alter the set of feasible self-enforcing informal agreements. Not writing a
formal contract in our model may be classiﬁed as one form of strategic ambiguity, although the
underlying models and logics are diﬀerent. While we model the dynamic contracting problem in
the context of inﬁnitely repeated interaction and emphasize the eﬀect on the alternative-use values,
they consider two-period dynamic models with or without intertemporal payoﬀ linkages.
28However, writing a formal price contract can still be beneﬁcial if the positive
eﬀect of decreasing the buyer’s reneging temptation by −(pj − pk) dominates the
negative eﬀect of increasing the seller’s reneging temptation by ak − a0.
Example In this example, there are three feasible investments a0,a 1,a 2 with a0 =
0, a1 =Δ a > 0, and a2 =2 Δ a: the investment cost increases linearly. Furthermore,
Δv ≡ v2−v1 = v1−v0 > Δa, so that the value of the product for the buyer increases
linearly as well. The inequality implies that the eﬃcient investment is a∗ = a2.A s
for the alternative-use values, we assume m0 <m 1 >m 2 satisfying p1−p0 > Δa and
−(p2 − p1) > Δa. The seller then chooses ao = a1 under spot transaction without a
formal price contract.
Consider the implementation of a∗ = a2. Conditions (DE-NC) and (DE-FP) are
rewritten as (14) and (15), respectively:
Δa − (p2 − p1) ≤
δ
1 − δ




(π2 − πo) (15)
Since Δa <p 1 − p2, the left-hand side of (15) is smaller than that of (14). That
is, writing a ﬁxed-price contract is valuable under repeated transactions, despite a
strictly negative value under spot transaction.
6E x t e n s i o n s
6.1 Uncertainty
In the main model analyzed in the previous sections there is no random factor. In
this subsection we introduce uncertainty into our model and illustrate that non-
contingent formal contracts can be valuable even under spot transaction when the
value of investment for alternative use is decreasing in a relation-speciﬁc investment.
29We also show that, if the transaction is repeated inﬁnitely, non-contingent formal
contracts can be valuable under a broader range of parameter values because of the
role that formal contracts can play under repeated transactions in mitigating the
parties’ reneging temptation.
To these purposes we extend the example in Section 3 where the seller chooses
no to invest (i =0 )o rt oi n v e s t( i = 1), the cost of which is a>0. The buyer’s
value of trade is vi(q,θ) when investment is i =0 ,1, and the seller’s production cost
is c(q). Note there are two changes from the example in Section 3: we include a
random variable θ and the level of trade q. While in Section 3 we assumed that
q is either 0 or 1, in this subsection we consider the case of more general quantity
to analyze eﬀects of uncertainty. In particular, we assume that the optimal level
of trade diﬀers across realizations of the random variable, as described in the next
paragraph. The true state (the realization of the random variable θ), which realizes
after investment, is symmetrically observable but unveriﬁable. The quantity of trade
and transfer payments are, however, veriﬁable.
For simplicity, we assume q ∈{ 0,1,2} and θ ∈{ θ1,θ 2},a n dw r i t ev
qh
i = vi(q,θh),
cq = c(q), with v0h











0 . The value of investment for alternative use is mi ≥ 0w h e n
investment is i, and we allow Δm = m1 − m0 to be positive or negative.
We make the following assumptions: (a) value v
qh
i and cost cq are strictly in-
creasing in q for all i and h;( b )φ11
i >φ 21
i ≥ mi and φ22
i >φ 12
i ≥ mi for all i;
(c) Δ1h
v ≥ 0, Δ2h
v > 0, and Δ2h
v ≥ Δ1h
v for all h. Assumption (b) implies that the
optimal quantity in state h is q = h. Assumption (c) implies that the gain from
trade is increasing in investment for each state, and exhibits increasing diﬀerences
in (i,q); investment and quantity are complementary.









which implies that the eﬃcient (ﬁrst-best) solution is to make an investment (and
trade q = h when the true state is h =1 ,2).
Spot transaction When no formal contract is written under spot transaction, the
parties renegotiate and agree with the eﬃcient quantity of trade after uncertainty is
resolved. We assume that the renegotiation transfer from the seller to the buyer is
determined by the generalized Nash bargaining solution with the seller’s share being
α ∈ [0,1). When investment is i, the renegotiation transfer in state h is determined
such that the seller’s ex post payoﬀ is
αφhh
i +( 1− α)mi.








i +( 1− α)mi − ai.
















0 +( 1− α)m0








v +( 1− α)Δm <a . (17)
31We assume this condition to hold so that the holdup problem (underinvestment)
arises. A necessary condition is
a>Δm, (18)
that is, the seller has no incentive to invest under alternative opportunities.
Next, suppose that the buyer and the seller write a formal contract (q,p)w h e r e
q ∈{ 1,2} is the quantity traded and p is the payment from the buyer to the seller.
First suppose q = 1. If the true state is θ1, the contract implements the eﬃcient
level of trade and hence there is no room for renegotiation. If the true state is θ2,
the parties void the contract, renegotiate and agree to trade q = 2. The seller’s ex
post payoﬀ is







The seller’s ex ante expected payoﬀ is thus










It is optimal for the seller to invest (i =1 )i f























v ) ≥ a. (19)
In state θ2, the seller obtains share α of the gain from renegotiation, φ22
i −φ12
i ,w h i c h
is weakly increasing in investment due to the assumption of complementarity. That
is, (φ22
1 − φ12
1 ) − (φ22
0 − φ12
0 ) ≡ Δ22
v − Δ12
v ≥ 0. Then, the seller chooses to invest
if its ex ante expected return from investment, 1
2α(Δ22
v − Δ12
v ), is greater than the
investment cost a. This is condition (19).





v ) ≥ a.
This condition never holds because Δ21
v ≥ Δ11
v by complementarity between invest-
ment and quantity. The price contract with q = 2 thus cannot induce the seller to
invest. We thus focus on contracts with q =1 .
Writing a formal contract can be valuable even under spot transaction if both
(17) and (19) hold. And the alternative-use value being decreasing in investment is
a necessary condition for a formal contract to be of value. To see this, note that if
Δm ≥ 0, the left-hand side of (17) is at least as large as αΔ22
v /2, while the left-hand
side of (19) is equal to or smaller than αΔ22
v /2.
Repeated transactions We now show that a formal contract can be valuable
within a broader range of parameter values under repeated transactions. Let us
assume that (17) holds while (19) does not, so that the seller cannot be induced to
invest under spot transaction. A formal contract along with repeated transactions
can still help in this situation. We can show this most simply by considering a special
case of α = 0: the buyer can obtain all the surplus from renegotiation. In this case,
(17) holds if Δm <a , and (19) does not in fact hold. Under repeated transactions, it
is not diﬃcult to show that investment i = 1 can be implemented without a formal
contract if and only if














33(See Appendix for derivation.) Similarly, it can be shown that i = 1 is implemented















(See Appendix for derivation.) The comparison is thus analogous to that between
(1) and (4) in Section 3. This implies that, if Δm < 0, there is a range of parameter
values within which the buyer is strictly better oﬀ by oﬀering a formal contract
under repeated transactions, even though formal contracts cannot induce the seller
to invest under spot transaction.
6.2 Vertical Integration
Vertical integration has been considered as an important remedy to the holdup prob-
lem in the literature. In our model, we have treated the seller and the buyer as
separate ﬁrms without explicitly considering an option for them to merge vertically.
In this subsection, we consider an extension of our model that incorporates the pos-
sibility of vertical integration between the seller and the buyer, by making use of the
framework developed by Baker et al. (2002). Through analyzing the extension, we
demonstrate that even if vertical integration is allowed, an optimal vertical struc-
ture can be non-integration in which the seller sells the product to the buyer under
a formal price contract and repeated transactions.
In this extension, we consider an economic environment consisting of a seller, a
buyer, and an asset. The seller needs to use the asset to produce the product. We
consider two cases. (i) The seller owns the asset. In this case the seller and the
buyer are not integrated, and we call this case “outsourcing.” (ii) The buyer owns
the asset. In this case the seller and the buyer are integrated and the seller is just an
employee of the buyer. We call this case “employment.” These terminologies follow
34Baker et al. (2002). The owner of the asset has the residual right of control over the
asset. Under outsourcing, the seller can thus use the asset freely, whether or not he
actually trades with the buyer. Under employment, however, the buyer can exclude
the seller from the use of the asset.
Our base model focuses on the case of outsourcing, where the seller can realize
the alternative-use value mi by using the asset to produce the product in an outside
market. Under employment, the seller cannot use the asset when he does not trade
with the buyer, and hence we assume that the disagreement payoﬀ to the seller as well
as to the buyer is zero. This implies that formal price contracts cannot help resolve
the holdup problem under employment, and hence in our analysis we assume that
no formal contract is written under employment. Following the standard literature
of the property rights approach (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990;
Hart, 1995), we assume that ownership only aﬀects the payoﬀs at the threat point,
while bargaining power is invariant.16
To simplify the analysis, we use our three-investment example in Subsection 5.4
with some modiﬁcation. We assume, as before, Δv = v2 − v1 = v1 − v0.W ea l t e r ,
however, the assumptions on the investment costs and the alternative-use values as
follows: Δa = a2 − a1 >a 1 − a0 = a1 > 0 (“convexity” of the cost function) and
Δm = m2 − m1 = m1 − m0. We allow Δm to be either positive or negative, but we
assume Δv > Δm. We also assume Δv > Δa so that a∗ = a2.
First consider spot transaction. Recall that since the investment is purely co-
16Baker et al. (2002) assume that under employment, the buyer has all the bargaining power and
can take the product without paying anything to the seller. In other words, under integration the
seller cannot reap any return from his/her investment in human capital, and it is hard to justify
this assumption as long as investment aﬀects his/her human capital. If we instead adopt their
assumption, then relational outsourcing with a formal price contract turns out to be equivalent to
relational employment, in a sense that Condition (DE-FP) is equivalent between these two cases. A
related remark is found in a footnote of their paper (footnote 6, p.44) where they argue, thanking
a referee for pointing it out, that employment “corresponds to a speciﬁc-performance contract that
requires the upstream party to deliver the good to the downstream party.” However, analogy to the
contract here seems misleading because the downstream party is not required to pay any money in
this setting, which is unrealistic if this is interpreted as a speciﬁc-performance contract.
35operative, formal price contracts perform at most as well as no contract under spot
transaction. We assume 2(αΔv +( 1− α)Δm) <a 2, which implies that under our
“spot outsourcing” without a formal contract, the seller prefers both a0 and a1 to
a2, and hence the holdup problem arises. The optimal investment for the seller, ao,





a1 if αΔv +( 1− α)Δm ≥ a1
a0 if αΔv +( 1− α)Δm <a 1
Under “spot employment,” the renegotiated price after investment ai is ri = αvi.
We assume that there is underinvestment in spot employment as well. The following
condition is suﬃcient.
2αΔv <a 2





a1 if αΔv ≥ a1
a0 if αΔv <a 1
If ae = ai, deﬁne the seller’s payoﬀ, the buyer’s payoﬀ, and the joint value, respec-
tively, as follows:
πe
S = w + ri − ai,π e
B = vi − w − ri,π e = vi − ai
The comparison of spot employment with spot outsourcing is simple. If the
“market incentive” is positive (Δm > 0), ao ≥ ae, while ao ≤ ae if the market
incentive is negative. Spot employment eliminates the eﬀect of the alternative-use
value on the renegotiated price. It is optimal if and only if the market incentive
attenuates the seller’s incentive to invest.
Next we analyze repeated transactions. Employment under repeated transactions
36is called “relational employment,” while outsourcing under repeated transactions is
called “relational outsourcing.” The major issue here is whether ownership can be
renegotiated after either party reneges on the relational contract. Baker et al. (2002)
assume that renegotiation costs are low enough to allow the parties to negotiate
over asset ownership. Under their assumption, the seller and the buyer thus choose
the optimal spot ownership structure, either spot outsourcing (if Δm > 0) or spot
employment (if Δm < 0) after reneging, and maintain that form forever. Halonen
(2002) introduces renegotiation costs explicitly, and considers the other polar case
in which costs are so high that the ownership structure will not be renegotiated.
If renegotiation over asset ownership is feasible, it turns out that the comparison
between relational outsourcing with no formal contract and relational employment is
the same as that between spot outsourcing and spot employment. That is, relational
employment is optimal if and only if Δm < 0. And noting that Δm < 0 is a necessary
condition for a formal price contract to dominate the no contract case in our model,
we can conclude that writing a formal price contract under relational outsourcing
is never optimal because relational employment can provide stronger investment
incentives for the seller through renegotiation.
In the rest of this subsection, we hence focus on the second case in which rene-
gotiation over asset ownership is infeasible. Condition (DE-NC) for relational out-
sourcing with no formal contract is rewritten as follows:
a2 − 2(αΔv +( 1− α)Δm) ≤
δ
1 − δ
(π2 − π0)i f αΔv +( 1− α)Δm <a 1 (22)
Δa − (αΔv +( 1− α)Δm) ≤
δ
1 − δ
(π2 − π1)i f αΔv +( 1− α)Δm ≥ a1 (23)
The corresponding condition for relational outsourcing with a formal price contract








(π2 − π1)i f αΔv +( 1− α)Δm ≥ a1 (25)
Finally, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for a2 to be implemented under rela-
tional employment can be derived similarly and is given as follows:
a2 − 2αΔv ≤
δ
1 − δ
(π2 − π0)i f αΔv <a 1 (26)
Δa − αΔv ≤
δ
1 − δ
(π2 − π1)i f αΔv ≥ a1 (27)
Now suppose Δm < 0. If αΔv ≥ a1 − (1 − α)Δm so that ao = ae = a1,o ri f
αΔv <a 1 so that ao = ae = a0, then the future loss from reneging is the same
under relational outsourcing with no formal contract, relational outsourcing with a
ﬁxed-price contract, or relational employment. And hence relational employment
(integration) is optimal. However, if a1 ≤ αΔv <a 1 − (1 − α)Δm so that ao = a0 <
a1 = ae, comparison is involved. In this case, we have to compare among (22), (24),
and (27). Under relational outsourcing with or without a formal contract, the future
per period loss is π2 − π0, which is larger than π2 − π1,t h ef u t u r ep e rp e r i o dl o s s
under relational employment. However, the left-hand side of (22) and that of (24)
are also larger than that of (27). We can thus show that depending on parameter
values, either form can be optimal. The following example in particular demonstrates
that relational outsourcing with a formal price contract can be optimal, even though
integration is allowed.
Example Suppose α =1 /2a n dΔ v +Δ m < 0. The triangle surrounded by bold
lines in Figure 1 represents the area where the eﬃcient investment is a2 (Δa < Δv),
there is underinvestment in spot employment (Δv <a 2), and ao = a0 <a 1 = ae
38holds (2a1 < Δv < 2a1 − Δm) so that the relevant dynamic enforcement conditions
are (22), (24), and (27). Since we assume Δv +Δ m < 0, the left-hand side of (22)
is larger than that of (24), and hence relational outsourcing with a formal contract
can implement the eﬃcient investment for smaller discount factors than relational
outsourcing with no formal contract. The remaining comparison is hence between
relational outsourcing with a formal contract and relational employment. From (24)
and (27) we ﬁnd that if 3a2 − 4a1 < 2Δv holds, there is a range of discount factors
in which the eﬃcient investment is implemented under relational outsourcing with a
formal contract but not under relational employment. This condition is satisﬁed in
the shaded area in Figure 1.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has oﬀered a new perspective on the role of formal contracts in resolving
the holdup problem. In situations where formal contracts have no value under spot
transaction due to the cooperative nature of the relation-speciﬁc investment, we have
shown that writing a simple ﬁxed-price contract can be valuable under repeated
transactions. In our model, there is a range of parameter values in which a formal
price contract combined with a relational contract can help mitigate the holdup
problem, while under another parameter range not writing a formal contract but
entirely relying on a relational contract increases the total surplus of the buyer and
the seller. The key factor in distinguishing between these two cases is how the
investment aﬀects the alternative-use value.
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43Appendix
Here we explain how to derive conditions (20) and (21).
First consider the case of no formal contract. In this extension, we can focus on
the class of relational contracts in which the parties agree that they trade q and the
buyer pays b
q
i to the seller if the true state is h = q. It is then optimal for the seller










0) ≥ a (IC )
holds. If the buyer does not pay b
q
i, then the parties renegotiate and the buyer oﬀers
mi, and hence the buyer’s reneging temptation is maxq,i(b
q
i − mi). Similarly, the
seller’s reneging temptation is −minq,i(b
q
i − mi).










that must be no greater than the sum of the future loss, which is equal to the
































≥ a − Δm
Condition (20) is hence necessary. For suﬃciency, suppose (20) holds. We deﬁne
(b
q

































i − mi)=a − Δm
which is, by (20), no greater than the future loss. Condition (20) is hence suﬃcient.
Next consider the case of a formal price contract (q,p). The parties agree, in
addition to the formal contract, that they trade q and the buyer pays b
q
i to the seller











0) ≥ a (IC )
Suppose ¯ q = 1, and the buyer does not pay b
q
i in state q. If the true state is
q = q = 1, the formal price contract is eﬃcient and there is no room for renegotiation.
The buyer’s payoﬀ from reneging is thus b
q
i −p. If the true state is q =2 = q, then the
parties renegotiate to trade q and the buyer oﬀers p− c1 + c2. The buyer’s reneging
temptation is therefore maxi{b1
i −p,b2
i −(p−c1+c2)}. Similarly, the seller’s reneging
temptation is −mini{b1
i − p,b2








































that must be no greater than the future loss. Similarly, we obtain the same condition
45when ¯ q = 2. Then, through the analogous procedure as in the no formal contract
case presented above, we ﬁnd that (21) is the necessary and suﬃcient condition.
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